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Interlocking directorates and conflicts of interest: The Rotterdamsche 
Bankvereeniging, Müller & Co. and the Dutch financial crisis of the 
1920s 
How can interlocking directorates cause financial instability for universal banks? 
A detailed history of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeninging in the 1920s answers 
this question in a case study. This large commercial bank adopted a new German-
style universal banking business model from the early 1910s, sharing directors 
with the firms it financed as a means of controlling its interests. Then, in 1924, it 
required assistance from the Dutch state in order to survive a bank run brought on 
by public concerns over its close ties with Müller & Co., a trading conglomerate 
that suffered badly in the economic downturn of the early 1920s. Using a new 
narrative history combined with an interpretive model, this article shows how the 
interlocking directorates between the bank and this major client, and in particular 
the direction of influence of these interlocks, resulted in a conflict of interest that 
could not be easily overcome. 
Keywords: interlocking directorates; conflicts of interest; financial crises; 
universal banking; the Netherlands 
Introduction 
Interlocking directorates refer to a corporate governance structure whereby directors 
serve on the boards of multiple firms. Probably the most common type of interlock 
analysed in the literature is that between financial institutions and non-financial firms. 
Whilst the practice of establishing bank-firm interlocks is not as popular in the 
Netherlands today as in neighbouring Germany,1 interlocks of this kind were all the 
rage in this country in the early twentieth century.2 Using a case study from this small 
open economy, which until the Second World War had a largely unregulated financial 
services sector,3 this article shows how understanding the “direction of influence” of an 
interlocking directorate is important in explaining how this governance structure can 
cause damaging conflicts of interest within universal banks, German-style financial 
institutions which offer both commercial and investment banking services.4  
Economic sociologists, financial economists and economic historians have each 
sought to explain the phenomenon of interlocking directorates. Broad categories of 
reasons advanced include:5 (1) Marxist theories of financial exploitation by social elites; 
(2) bank-control and family-control explanations, which use agency theory to analyse 
banker or family networks as decision-making centres of high-finance; (3) the resource-
dependency view, where interlocks are used by firms as a means of lowering 
information and transaction costs and gaining privileged access to markets; (4) the 
managerial view, where interlocks are merely expressions of prestige; and (5) the class-
cohesion view, where directors are all recruited from a common social group and 
contribute to this group’s social cohesion.  
Economic sociologists in particular have shown that these five explanations are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive; some mixture can operate side-by-side.6 Financial 
economists have been predominantly occupied with the task of measuring the costs and 
benefits of interlocks.7 They show that trade-offs exist between improved monitoring on 
the one hand, and various conflicts of interest on the other. Contributions to this journal 
have been good at quantifying interlocks between banks and non-financials in history.8 
Taken together, they demonstrate that their costs and benefits vary wildly across time 
and by place. Elsewhere, economic historians have shown that bank-firm interlocks can 
in some markets significantly improve firm performance, whilst their presence in others 
is merely a sign of bankers’ desperation.9 
Aside from sociological researches that use interviews to ascertain the influence 
of specific interlocks,10 studies of interlocking directorates have largely provided 
macro-perspectives on this corporate governance structure, looking to quantify their 
effects at an aggregated level. Consequently, these works offer limited insight into the 
micro-level process through which interlocks can affect performance, including the 
impact of an interlock’s direction of influence – whether firms end up managing or 
being managed by their ties. To understand an interlock’s direction of influence, the 
first step in a micro-study must be to ascertain whether a firm sends or receives 
executives from its interlocked firms. But a catalogue of this alone is insufficient to 
conclusively determine direction; factors including executive remuneration, social ties, 
prestige, and even personality type may result in executives doing the bidding of their 
interlocked firms rather than that of their primary employer.   
This article contributes by providing the micro-level detail necessary to 
understand the full implications of interlocking directorates in a case study from Dutch 
history. It analyses the interlock between the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, a large 
universal bank, and Wm. H. Müller & Co., a trading conglomerate. Referred to simply 
by its acronym “Robaver” in the contemporary press, this bank is one of the main 
predecessors of ABN AMRO, which until it was split up and sold off in 2007 was 
among the world’s largest.11 Meanwhile, Müller & Co. partly survives today in the form 
of Imtech, a technical services provider to the shipping and construction industries.12 
Executives of these two concerns, which both came close to failure in the Dutch 
financial crisis of the 1920s, sat on each other’s supervisory boards. The direction of 
influence was not obviously from the bank to the firm; the fact that this was a mutual tie 
alone suggests that the nature of this interlock can only be gleaned from a detailed case 
history. 
The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of the Robaver-Müller tie on 
the performance of Robaver during the 1920s, to discern whether, and to what degree, 
the interlock was responsible for the bank’s near collapse in 1924. By examining this 
interlock at a time of crisis, this article is able to explore the workings of a corporate 
governance structure that remain largely hidden in more stable times, when issues 
surrounding bank leadership tend to be largely uncontroversial in the eyes of the 
investing public. The method used is to construct, and then analyse, a detailed narrative 
of the Robaver crisis that combines contemporary press commentary with the internal 
records of the bank. By comparing the events of the Robaver-Müller case with those 
surrounding another of the bank’s problematic managerial ties, and by contrasting the 
performance of Robaver with that of a competing bank that chose a different business 
policy and corporate governance structure, this article advances an “interpretive model” 
to explain how the direction of influence of an interlocking directorate can determine 
the nature and severity of conflicts of interest.13 Together, the narrative and model 
suggest that Robaver’s newly adopted universal banking business model left it with a 
flat, or decentralised, organisational structure, and a lemon as a major customer whose 
director was able to use this structure to his own advantage. Robaver could not extract 
itself from Müller & Co.’s ailing businesses unaided because the interlock made it 
difficult to influence the trading conglomerate’s business policy. It faced no such issues, 
however, with one of Müller & Co.’s rivals, with which Robaver’s managerial tie was 
solely one-directional, from bank to firm. Meanwhile, Robaver’s main competitor 
helped to save the bank by providing it with managerial expertise. 
Other than the work of De Vries,14 little primary research has been conducted 
into the course of the crisis at Robaver;15 economic histories of the period mostly derive 
their business history insights from his work. But whilst De Vries’s account forms the 
most complete narrative of the crisis to date, it looks at the debacle with one particular 
set of archival sources only: those of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Dutch’s 
state’s bank of issue.16 This perspective is invaluable in that it reveals the internal 
motivations and justifications for the actions of an institution that came closer to 
fulfilling the role of a modern central bank in the course of the 1920s than it had ever 
done before. But De Vries’s sources only tell half the story. This article uses the internal 
management records of Robaver itself to build a new narrative from another 
perspective, and marries these with contemporary newspaper opinion in order to 
contrast this insider perspective with an outsider’s view on the unfolding events. 
Moreover, it uses information economics, which studies how information and its 
revelation affect economic decisions, to interpret this narrative, to build a stylised model 
of the Dutch case.17 
The Dutch financial services sector in the early twentieth century 
Financial sectors around the world are often categorised as being either bank-based or 
market-based.18 There is a long tradition, epitomised by the work of Gerschenkron, 
which classifies Germany as being bank-based and the UK as market-based.19 The idea 
is that bank-based financial sectors are populated with powerful universal banks which 
offer the full range of financial services, whilst market-based ones contain less 
influential functionally-separated commercial and investment banks. Whilst in the 
former, banks actively hold equity stakes in non-financial firms, in the latter, non-
financials use banks only to help place their equity on open markets, where it is bought 
by a diverse constituency of investors. Whilst this view has been somewhat revised by 
economic historians,20 it nevertheless remains a useful characterisation, with countries 
lying somewhere between these two theoretical extremes.  
The Netherlands is an interesting case in point. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, the country’s banks played second fiddle to its capital markets. But from about 
1911, and especially during the Great War, the economy started to look more like the 
bank-based German one. Banks replaced the prolongatie on-call money market that had 
dominated Dutch finance in the nineteenth century.21 A wave of bank mergers 
commenced just prior to the Great War to create sophisticated multi-branch networks 
with a wide portfolio of clients.22 The war itself and the post-war economic boom that 
followed sped up banks’ move towards being universal in scope, with banks directly 
financing businesses with both debt and equity. The regulatory regime at the time was 
relatively laissez-faire: Dutch law did not prohibit commercial banks from providing 
investment services.  
Figure 1 plots the equity-deposit ratio for the period 1917 to 1931 for Robaver, 
the Amsterdamsche Bank (Ambank), its main competitor, and the Big Five Dutch banks 
together.23 This ratio, used by Verdier to measure the characteristics of a country’s 
banking sector, is calculated as banks’ least liquid resources (capital plus reserves) 
divided by their most liquid ones (deposits plus savings).24 It captures the idea that 
commercial banks, which specialise in short-term lending, have little need for long-term 
equity and instead finance their activities with short-term deposits and savings. 
Meanwhile, universal banks must maintain long-term resources as they hold long-term 
stakes in industry. Lower values indicate that commercial banks dominate; higher 
values indicate universal ones do. The figure suggests that Dutch banks became “more 
universal” in their service provision up until about 1924, and returned to their earlier 
nineteenth-century functional separation by the early 1930s; the financial sector became 
more bank-based in the decade leading up to the crisis, and returned to being market-
based following its conclusion. The structure of Robaver’s balance sheet exemplifies 
this pattern, whilst that of rival Ambank lies at the other end of the spectrum.25 
By tradition, Dutch firms employed a dual board structure on the German 
model, with a management board made up of directeuren (executive directors), and 
supervisory board of commissarissen (non-executive directors).26 Jonker uses the 
number of interlocks between banks and industry as an indicator of banking scope, with 
an increase in interlocks suggesting a move towards universal service provision, as 
banks install directors in the firms they finance.27 He finds that interlocks more than 
doubled in the early 1920s, from 200 interlocks in 1920 to 431 in 1923. A large part of 
this was due to changes at Robaver: from 20 interlocks in 1910 to 127 in 1923. But the 
trend went far beyond this bank: De Jong and Röell find that, in 1923, the proportion of 
non-financial exchange-listed firms with no bank interlocks was 40 per cent, whilst 22 
per cent had one interlock, 12 per cent had two, 8 per cent had three and 18 per cent had 
more than three.28 Most interlocks were between the supervisory boards of banks and 
non-financial firms (47 per cent), but a substantial portion involved a directeur of a 
bank sitting as a commissaris of a non-financial (29 per cent). 
Under the stewardship of Willem Westerman, its president, Robaver was 
established in 1911 following the merger of the Rotterdamsche Bank – itself set up in 
1863 by a group of Rotterdam businessmen – with the Deposito- en 
Administratiebank.29 Then, in the same year, Robaver took over the Amsterdam 
securities house Determeyer Weslingh & Zoon, granting it direct access to the trading 
floor of Amsterdam’s stock exchange, at the time a coup for a Rotterdam-based bank. 
Finally, the bank acquired the investment bank Labouchère Oyens & Co. in 1913, 
which brought with it financial relationships with the shipping and mining subsidiaries 
of Müller & Co. The centre of power at Robaver subsequently shifted north, with its 
new Amsterdam office becoming at least as important as its old headquarters in 
Rotterdam. This led to a flat organisational structure where, in many respects, offices 
operated de facto independently of one another. Robaver then bought up provincial 
banks and merged these into a single subsidiary, the Utrecht-based Nationale 
Bankvereeniging (Natobank), described by Westerman’s son as part of a conscious 
expansionary strategy to emulate Germany’s universal banks.30 The bank was among 
the first to mechanise its back-office,31 and, by the early 1920s, was the country’s 
second-largest bank by market capitalisation.32 It was also the largest casualty of the 
1920s financial crisis, which, as the research in this paper uncovers, wiped out over a 
third of its capital and led to a serious bank run.33  
The existing literature on the macro-causes of the 1920s financial crisis is 
dominated by the work of Jonker,34 the definitive restatement of which is found in Van 
Zanden’s contribution to an edited volume on Dutch financial history.35 It holds that the 
crisis was a result of banks' over-exuberance during the Great War and immediate post-
war period. Large and sustained declines in aggregate demand and prices in the early 
1920s – declines which were largely due to international factors, but arguably 
aggravated by (expectations of) the Dutch guilder’s return to pre-war gold parity – put 
pressure on business and thus the banking sector which it had increasingly come to rely 
on. In short, Dutch banks became over-exposed to the sectors of the economy that 
suffered most at the hands of debt-deflation.36 The next section illustrates how this 
macro-cause was felt at a micro-level in the case of Robaver. 
A narrative of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging in crisis 
This is a single case study, and so no a priori and testable theoretical model of the 
causes of banking crises is developed. Instead this section serves to lay bare the facts of 
this particular crisis in a case narrative. The next section develops an interpretive model 
that uses information economics to understand these facts. The narrative starts in late 
1922, as the signs of the problems surrounding the Robaver-Müller interlock start to 
become apparent to the outside world.37 It ends in late 1925, as the post-crisis clean-up 
operation is in full swing. In particular, the narrative highlights three aspects of the 
Robaver crisis: (1) the internal management difficulties experienced by the bank; (2) the 
impact of information asymmetries between privileged insiders and the investing public 
on the bank’s fate; and (3) how interlocking directorates influenced both these aspects.  
Before proceeding, this story’s primary protagonists are introduced. Key players 
at Robaver were: (1) Willem Westerman, who became a Robaver director in 1904 and 
was made its president in 1908; and bank directors (2) J.P. van Tienhoven, and (3) K.P. 
van der Mandele, both installed by Westerman in 1910.38 Meanwhile, at Ambank, 
Robaver’s main competitor, an important figure in the narrative is: (4) Arie J. van 
Hengel, one of that bank’s directors. Key policymakers include: (5) Gerard Vissering, 
president of DNB; and (6) Hendrikus Colijn, minister of state for finances and a future 
prime minister. Crucial in the story is: (7) Anton G. Kröller, who succeeded his brother 
Willem and married into the family of the Rotterdam and Düsseldorf-based shipbrokers 
Müller, and from 1889 came to manage the company that was started by his father-in-
law and brother.39 By the 1920s, Wm. H. Müller & Co. was a commanditaire 
vennootschap (limited partnership) operating out of The Hague, with trading, 
shipbuilding and mining subsidiaries operating around the world. Robaver developed a 
long-standing commercial and investment banking relationship with the Müller 
concerns; both Westerman and Van Tienhoven sat on the supervisory board of Müller & 
Co.,40 whilst Kröller sat on that of Robaver from 1916.41 
Public suspicions and attempted solutions 
Whilst the independence of Robaver’s Rotterdam and Amsterdam offices may have 
served the bank well in good times, conflicts between these branches started to emerge 
as the Dutch deflationary recession started to bite in 1922. At the weekly bank directors’ 
meeting of 2 November 1922 there is a lively discussion about Westerman’s unilateral 
decision to guarantee a new loan of US$3 million to Müller & Co. for its American 
cereal trading operations, arranged through Robaver’s Amsterdam office.42 Y.J.H. van 
der Meulen, a director at the Rotterdam branch of the bank, is angry that he was only 
informed about this loan after it had already been issued and wishes that in future all 
directors be consulted over such large positions. He is concerned about the risks Müller 
& Co. is taking and their impact on the liquidity of the bank as a whole. Van Tienhoven 
and Van der Mandele do not appear to share Van der Meulen’s grievances. 
From an outsider’s perspective, Robaver looks fragile. In De Kroniek, a 
respected fortnightly financial journal established and edited by Amsterdam-based 
accountant and lawyer Alexander Sternheim, concern is voiced about the latest 
company accounts filed by the bank.43 The article argues that it is the most vulnerable 
of the Big Five and speculates that its problems are caused by: (1) the downward 
business cycle in general; and (2) clients in shipping and mining in particular. The 
subtext of the second is that the bank is too close to Müller & Co.; knowledge of the 
bank’s long-standing mutual management interlock was in the public domain. The 
article criticises Robaver for failing to report its obligations towards its Natobank 
subsidiary, and failing to explain why the bank’s profits are lower than in previous 
years. 
Returning to a view from the inside, with another indication of management 
difficulties: on 11 September 1923, Westerman tells his fellow directors that he feels he 
has recently been left out of the loop in decisions to take on new business. The minutes 
read: ‘If he [Westerman] had sole say, many unwanted credits would not have been 
issued’.44 To tackle the apparent lack of coordination and communication between the 
bank’s Rotterdam and Amsterdam offices, Westerman increases the importance of the 
national directiecentrale (management centre), housed at a newly-constructed branch of 
Robaver in The Hague – “neutral territory” halfway between the two cities. All 
accounting functions are moved to this single branch in an attempt to replace the bank’s 
flat organisational structure with a more hierarchical one. 
The following month, on 4 October, considerable time is spent discussing the 
state of affairs at Compañia Mercantil Argentina, a free-standing company operating in 
Buenos Aires in which Müller & Co. has the majority stake and on whose raad van 
bestuur (governing council) Westerman, Van Tienhoven, Kröller and his right-hand 
man, Salomon van Deventer, sit as members. The minutes record the objections of a 
Robaver director, Daniël Ornstein: ‘[…] every year our position worsens. Every year 
our losses increase and the chance of making a profit grows smaller. Does this really 
weigh positively against possible better returns in the long term?’45 The directors decide 
to grant the firm a temporary loan using its Hollandsche Bank voor Zuid-Amerika 
subsidiary as a front, and to issue Müller & Co. with an ultimatum to reduce the risks of 
its American operations.46 Willem van der Vorm, a ship-owner, coal merchant and a 
Robaver commissaris,47 proposes a change to the bank’s statutes that would force 
greater cooperation between the bank’s directeuren and commissarissen. It is highly 
probable that he was seeking a more effective way of dealing with Kröller. Westerman 
disagrees, as such a change may scare the public; he wishes to handle the matter more 
informally.  
Müller & Co. was not Robaver’s only problematic client; the Nederlandsche 
Maatschappij voor Scheepsvaart, Handel en Nijverheid – a joint-venture between the 
former Dutch subsidiary of shipbrokers Furness Withy (fully in Dutch hands since 
1912) and the Rotterdam merchant house R.S. Stokvis & Zonen – is the subject of much 
discussion at the monthly meetings of the commissarissen, an example of which is 
found on 19 March 1924:48 Van Tienhoven reports problems at one of that firm’s 
subsidiary companies that places Robaver in a ‘less than pleasant’ position. Furness-
Stokvis, as the joint-venture is informally known, and which Van der Mandele helped to 
supervise in his capacity of commissaris,49 is described shortly after this meeting in an 
article in De Kroniek as being ‘naïve and fantastical’ if its managers think they can 
solve all the concern’s problems with their plan to write off 10 per cent of its share 
capital.50  
Despite the bank’s internal worries, the publication of Robaver’s annual report 
to shareholders in May 1924 reads on the whole upbeat, blaming the bank’s ‘minor 
problems’ on the business cycle.51 The report apparently passed through the bank’s 
layers of management with little opposition: its commissarissen approved a draft with 
just minor corrections at their meeting on 23 April,52 thus agreeing to a 4.5 million-
guilder dividend for ordinary shareholders. Meanwhile, De Kroniek is not overly 
convinced with the bank’s upbeat tone, suggesting that it still has to kick the habit of 
inflating its figures.53 The article estimates that of the bank’s reported 36.5 million 
guilders of reserves, 20 million are in the form of equity shares in industry. With a 
further reported 18.4 million in shares in other financial institutions, the article argues 
that the reserves are not very liquid, and that their function ‘as a guarantee for 
profitability is limited’.54 It questions how the bank is financing its dividend and 
concludes that ‘only a very positive upswing in the business cycle that increases the 
bank’s profitability can stabilise her position’.55  
Drastic measures 
The Robaver crisis proper plays out over the summer of 1924. On 12 May, within a 
month of paying a dividend, the minutes of the directors’ meeting state that DNB ‘shall 
open a special emergency overdraft account for us using promissory notes of various of 
our illiquid debtors as collateral’.56 Further details about this account are discussed at 
the meeting on 15 May of the newly-formed comité – an extra layer of management 
created by Westerman and consisting of the bank’s directeuren and a few of its 
commissarissen, and from which Kröller was excluded.57 One director notes that 
‘rigorous steps’ need to be taken in order to increase Robaver’s liquidity. Featured at the 
top of the bank’s list of problematic clients are Furness-Stokvis and Müller & Co. The 
minutes reveal a consensus that a mere transfer of some of Müller & Co.’s loans to 
other banks is insufficient, and that a more permanent solution needs to be found that 
addresses the root cause of that concern’s difficulties.58 
By the time of the next directors’ meeting on 26 May, Van Tienhoven has 
visited DNB to make formal arrangements for the emergency overdraft, set at 35 
million guilders.59 At this point in the negotiations the Furness-Stokvis account appears 
to have been left out of the equation, and the loan is designed to cover German cereal 
credits and the Müller & Co. / Compañia Mercantil accounts only. Meanwhile, the 
bank’s Rotterdam and Amsterdam offices appear to have been busy cleansing 
themselves of bad loans. However, one of the directors warns that they have now 
exhausted this avenue of increasing liquidity. The directors collectively decide that they 
are to inform Furness-Stokvis that they wish to cease any further dealings with that 
company. 
Two days later, during a meeting of the comité on 28 May, Robaver’s managers 
plan a drastic course of action aimed at restoring public confidence in the bank. An 
annex to the meeting’s minutes, marked as ‘highly confidential’, discusses how, as a 
consequence of adverse media attention, mistrust in the bank has reached such heights 
that it has caused incredible downward pressure on Robaver’s share price, which in time 
could have very serious consequences.60 Figure 2 shows that the share price – which 
until May remained at a very stable level, trading almost at par – jumped downwards by 
about five percentage points. 
Westerman opines to his fellow directors that the public, and especially financial 
professionals, blame him and Van Tienhoven personally for the bank’s state of affairs. 
Van Tienhoven then informs the directors that he has decided to resign from his post to 
act as a ‘peace offering’ to the public. Westerman’s plan is to call an Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM) of shareholders in August, at which the position of bank 
president will be abolished. Instead he proposes that the bank should be led by a new 
body, a raad van toezicht (overseeing council). Westerman would then swap his current 
position for that of joint president of the commissarissen and the raad. In Westerman’s 
opinion, the key advantage to the status quo is that the bank would be led by consensus: 
Westerman would have members of the raad constantly around him for advice. 
However, there is some discussion as to whether the public would perceive it in this 
way, as essentially the same individuals would remain in charge, albeit in different 
guises. Other directors are worried that the dual resignation would have the opposite 
effect to that intended, that such an announcement could lead to further adverse 
fluctuations in Robaver’s share price. 
Westerman presents his plan, now agreed upon by his colleague directors, at a 
specially convened meeting of all directeuren and commissarissen on 5 June.61 He 
opines to those present, among whom Kröller, that ‘recently he is under the impression 
that it is not going well with the bank, especially in Amsterdam’. The bank’s 
directeuren inform its commissarissen that Robaver has been forced to buy up 2.6 
million guilders of its own shares in order to stabilise the price, which explains the 
periods of unusual price stability observed in Figure 2. They argue, and the 
commissarissen appear to agree, that Westerman’s plan should be implemented, as 
further share price support is unsustainable. A week later, at the 12 June comité 
meeting, the minutes read that the bank’s liquidity still ‘leaves something to be 
desired’.62 Müller & Co. and Furness-Stokvis are again fingered as the culprits. Details 
of Van Tienhoven’s resignation, which is planned for 15 June, are outlined. There is 
discussion of a rumour circulating at the stock exchange that Westerman is the one to be 
resigning, which they plan to ‘positively deny’ when dealing with the press. 
Announcement, crash and run 
On 16 June 1924 De Kroniek publishes the news of Van Tienhoven’s resignation. The 
accompanying comment praises his time at Robaver:63 
The change in position of Mr Van Tienhoven is undoubtedly one of the most 
important occurrences in the area of banking in recent times. From 1912, and 
especially during the war, Mr Van Tienhoven has been the most important driving 
force behind the bank merger movement and in the finance of domestic industry.  
However, Van Tienhoven’s resignation proves insufficient to calm markets. 
Two weeks later, on 1 July 1924, DNB makes the following communiqué available to 
the press:64 
The various rumours concerning the financial position of the Rotterdamsche 
Bankvereeniging have motivated the directors of this institution to turn to the 
president of De Nederlandsche Bank, whom they are providing with all materials 
regarding the bank’s liquidity. Following an examination of the supplied materials, 
the president of De Nederlandsche Bank has proclaimed that he is prepared to work 
with the directors of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, and if necessary to 
maintain her liquidity.  
There is a strange absence of records of directors meetings in the immediate 
build-up to the publication of the above communiqué. From De Vries’s account of the 
Robaver crisis, which makes use of the personal correspondence of some of the bank’s 
directors deposited in DNB’s archives, it appears that these meetings were held in 
private at the homes of directors and remained unminuted.65 Interestingly, De Vries 
notes that a group of Robaver directors initially approached DNB president Vissering 
with news of the bank’s problems without Westerman’s knowledge. Later, on 30 June, 
and now in the presence of Westerman, Vissering arranges 50 million guilders of 
support for Robaver, under guarantee from finance minister Colijn. De Vries argues that 
Colijn does not initially wish to support Robaver’s share price, but is later convinced to 
do so by Westerman.66  
Whilst the public appears to remain in the dark about the goings on in the 
finance ministry,67 Westerman explains in detail the chain of events that led to DNB’s 
intervention, and the published communiqué, at the next meeting of the commissarissen 
on 10 July:68  
Towards the end of June the supply of our shares was increased in such quantities, 
that the directors did not dare to buy them up. After a discussion with the Comité, 
they [the directors] decided to call in help from De Nederlandsche Bank, which 
declared a willingness to help in principle, but required further discussion with the 
government before a firm commitment could be made. […] The Minister [Colijn] 
declared that it was in the interest of the nation to avoid a catastrophe, and that he 
was therefore willing to support the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging with a 
substantial sum. […] there was talk with De Nederlandsche Bank about a 
fl.100,000,000 support, but De Nederlandsche Bank is to limit her involvement to 
fl.50,000,000 for the meantime, and that support for the share price, about which 
the Minister had shown an interest, was not on the table. In return De 
Nederlandsche Bank demanded the publication of a communiqué in the 
newspapers, which our directors conceded to under pressure. This communiqué 
was published in the morning papers of Tuesday 2 July, with the well-known 
disastrous consequences.  
The disastrous consequences in question were: (1) a crash in Robaver’s share 
price (see Figure 2); and (2) what appears to be a sizable run on the bank’s branch 
network. A meeting of the comité held just prior to that of the commissarissen reveals 
that in the period 28 June to 5 July the bank’s depositors withdrew money to the tune of 
42.4 million guilders, bringing reserves to a new total of 96.6 million – a drop of some 
30 per cent.69 However, a fully-blown run on the bank, depleting all its resources, was 
apparently avoided: ‘At the current moment withdrawals appear to have come to an 
end’.70 The government provided 10 million guilders with which to stabilise the share 
price because DNB refused to do so itself. But Colijn did not initially want to be seen 
openly to have lent support to Robaver and therefore used an intermediary, the firm Van 
Loon & Co.71 Later in the same meeting, the minutes record that DNB wishes Robaver 
to appoint a ‘competent Dutchman of standing’ as a new director who would then help 
reassure the public. 
Post-mortems and purges 
On 15 July, De Kroniek publishes a detailed report on the Robaver crisis addressing 
four issues:72 (1) what occurred in the two weeks following the communiqué; (2) the 
possible cause of the crisis; (3) how Robaver can regain investors’ trust; and (4) the role 
of DNB. These are summarised as follows. (1) In the period since the communiqué, the 
article notes that ‘the panicky reaction has disappeared completely and has made way 
for a period of calm, but without any clarification about the factual events’. It argues 
that the wording of the communiqué was probably too negative and that the liquidity 
was probably never in danger. (2) Robaver was probably overvalued as a result of the 
25 million guilders worth of new shares that were issued by the bank in 1919; its author 
points his finger at the expansionary policy of the bank. (3) The only way in which 
Robaver can regain the public’s trust is to publish a full and frank admission of its 
mistakes. Robaver also needs a new banker in charge who can be trusted, and a new set 
of commissarissen. (4) The article notes that the firm Van Loon & Co. bought up the 
shares that stabilised the concern’s price at 89 per cent of par. Unaware of the 
government’s involvement, the newspaper speculates that this was probably carried out 
under the guarantee of DNB, a course of action about which its editor is deeply 
concerned.  
On 17 September, a secret draft restructuring plan is presented to Robaver’s 
commissarissen.73 It proposes to reduce the capitalisation of Robaver by swapping 25 
million guilders worth of shares for amortisation certificates against future profits. The 
source of the shares is as follows: 15 million from the state-backed syndicate that was 
formed to support the share price during the intervention, and the 10 million worth of 
Robaver shares held by Müller & Co.; Kröller’s managerial influence over Robaver 
before the crisis appears to have been accompanied by not insubstantial cross-
ownership, albeit with murky provenance.74 This 25 million guilder swap is to be used 
to write off bad debt (21 million) and buy back additional Robaver shares (4 million). A 
further 3 million of securities and property are to be covered by profits, and 15 million 
guilders worth of guarantees towards its subsidiary banks (including Natobank) are to 
come from a newly-created special reserve. De Vries’s account of the crisis argues that 
DNB and the Dutch state were very involved in the drafting of this restructuring plan.75 
This is supported by the minutes of the comité meeting held immediately prior to the 17 
September commissarissen meeting, at which a dialogue between Robaver and DNB is 
recounted.76 Despite Van der Mandele’s pleas, Furness-Stokvis, the firm he helps to 
supervise, is not incorporated into this restructuring plan. 
The finalised details of this restructuring plan, minus the identities of its 
financial backers, are published only a month later in De Kroniek.77 The press release 
also informs shareholders that the position of president is to be abolished, that 
Westerman is to be redeployed as a commissaris and that Van Hengel, a director at 
Ambank, is to be made gedelegeerd commissaris (de facto caretaker president). De 
Kroniek addresses three issues concerning Robaver’s news: (1) the continued lack of 
clarity concerning the crisis; (2) the possibility of harmful collusion in the banking 
sector; and (3) the position of Westerman. These are addressed as follows. (1) The 
article argues that the public is none the wiser as to why the crisis occurred in the first 
place. The press release does not reveal the origin of the 25 million to be used to reduce 
the bank’s capitalisation, only that it is from ‘friendly hands’. (2) The choice of Van 
Hengel as caretaker president concerns De Kroniek because he is from a competing 
bank where he plans to maintain his position, a managerial tie the newspaper’s editor 
views as potentially dangerous for customers. (3) The article notes that if Westerman is 
truly responsible for the crisis, then he should be removed from the bank’s management 
completely, and not simply be given a new position.78  
By the time of the next issue of De Kroniek, EGMs have taken place at both 
Robaver and Ambank to ratify the restructuring plans and staff changes. The article 
argues that six questions concerning the role of DNB need answering before the sector 
can return to normality:79 (1) Does DNB act objectively? (2) Has it carried out any 
additional interventions, other than ascertaining the liquidity of Robaver, outside of its 
traditional mandate? (3) What was the motivation behind the (now infamous) 
communiqué if, as all parties now maintain, the liquidity of Robaver was never in 
danger? (4) Why is DNB concerning itself with the internal matters of private banks? 
(5) Has DNB acted in the public interest? And finally, (6) can the banking sector 
continue to operate without any new regulations? 
Long-term solutions 
Van Hengel stayed on at Robaver until 1927, after which he returned to Ambank. 
During his reign, three wide-sweeping reforms were implemented at the bank: (1) he 
paved the way for the incorporation of the Natobank subsidiary into Robaver; (2) he 
oversaw a comprehensive change of personnel on the bank’s supervisory board; and (3) 
he led the restructuring of bad debt. Van Hengel’s changes were conducted not without 
opposition from Robaver’s existing team of directors,80 or its major clients.  
Especially Van Hengel’s efforts to restructure the debt of the Müller & Co. 
conglomerate were important for the bank’s long-run stability. His close involvement is 
evident from his collected personal correspondence with Kröller.81 On 20 December 
1924, he wrote the first in a series of letters to the Müller & Co. chairman advocating 
that he needed to divest his non-core business ventures, employ professional directors 
and stop using borrowed money as working capital. Kröller proves to be a very difficult 
person to work with, however; on numerous occasions the two are at loggerheads about 
the best way to solve the company’s problems and reduce Robaver’s exposure to his 
concerns. On 28 March 1925, Kröller writes that his business’s woes are merely due to 
the bad economic climate and that its bank loans are on a sounder footing than Van 
Hengel’s letters insinuate. Kröller’s strategy appears to have been to keep Robaver in 
the dark about his activities until they go awry; Van Hengel’s constant demands for 
information about various Müller & Co. accounts stay unanswered, but when Kröller 
needs additional funds to keep a particular business venture alive – such as his ill-fated 
English & Dutch Meat Company investment in the summer of 1925, a company which 
later goes bust82 – he writes to Van Hengel for new loans as if it is “business as usual”.  
Van Hengel works with Müller & Co. to produce some figures on the concern’s 
health, but Westerman, who in late 1925 acts as a go-between, argues for their 
publication to be delayed, as information about the true state of affairs could make 
investors jumpy; he opines on 11 December that if this information were revealed to 
investors, that they may draw the conclusion that in the event all Kröller-managed 
concerns had to be liquidated, then this would result in financial ruin for Robaver.83 Van 
Hengel’s attempt to install new managers at Müller & Co. subdivisions was constantly 
blocked by Kröller, who on 18 December 1925 writes that because he was personally 
responsible for building up the “Müller Empire”, only he knew how to lead it 
effectively. Kröller even threatens to switch to a competing bank, the Nederlandsche 
Indische Handelsbank. But his attempt to use this as leverage to improve his chances 
with Robaver proves unsuccessful. Kröller appears to have lost his influence over 
Robaver; government intervention, new bank managers and the dilution of his Robaver 
stake reversed the direction of influence of the Robaver-Müller tie.  
Van Hengel was eventually successful at unwinding Robaver’s position in 
Müller & Co. by placing the viable parts of the concern in a new business vehicle, and 
keeping its shares as collateral on its loans. Then, in 1927, Kröller was able to repay 
these loans by selling his Swedish mining investments.84 But the firm remained weak 
and suffered greatly in the early 1930s; Kröller was forced from his post in 1931. 
Meanwhile, Furness-Stokvis, the other company that was constantly fingered by 
Robaver’s managers as a cause of the bank’s woes, was bankrupted by 1936 and 
subsequently liquidated.85  
An interpretive model of the crisis 
The narrative of the previous section shows that Robaver’s strategy of expanding into 
the business of universal banking had left it with a flat organisational structure that was 
ill-designed for managers to effectively steer it through a period of debt-deflation. 
Whilst a universal business model does not as a rule lead to decentralised management, 
nor necessarily an increased use of interlocking directorates, it did in the Dutch case. 
Different branches operated almost independently of one another, with various directors 
building personal empires of interlocks, a structure that exposed the bank to the abuses 
of a large client with which it shared managers. Unlike other problematic customers, the 
Müller & Co. positions could not be easily unwound because of the great power that 
Kröller, that firm’s director, held over Robaver’s managers and the lack of influence 
Robaver’s managers had over Müller & Co., despite, or because of, their mutual 
managerial tie. Robaver became so intertwined with Müller & Co. that Kröller was able 
to use it as his private piggy bank, receiving ever-larger loans for ill-advised foreign 
ventures. The Robaver-Müller tie can at this stage be characterised by the resource-
dependency view of interlocks,86 where Kröller uses his position to receive financing 
that he would never have secured elsewhere. A similarly problematic client in the same 
line of business, but with which the direction of influence went the other way, did not 
enjoy this privileged treatment; the bank was able to cut its ties with Furness-Stokvis 
relatively rapidly.  
Recognising that there were conflicts of interest between the bank and the firm, 
the bank’s management deliberately and systematically covered up what it was doing by 
obfuscating where Kröller’s money was coming from. Top management tried to quell 
the various rumours about the state of the bank’s finances, first by restructuring the way 
executive decisions were made by strengthening the role of the new management centre 
in The Hague, subsequently by excluding Kröller from the decision-making process, 
then by artificially supporting Robaver’s share price, and finally by turning to DNB for 
emergency assistance. DNB itself secretly turned to the finance ministry for help, 
worried that it could not bear Robaver’s burden on its own, or scared that supporting it 
would eat away at its profits – the Netherland’s bank of issue had itself private 
shareholders to answer to. When the public caught wind of what was happening, a stock 
crash and bank run ensued, which no amount of internal management reshuffling could 
stop. In order to solve the crisis, it took existing managers to be purged and replaced 
with outsiders, the bank’s position in Müller & Co. to be unwound and DNB to make 
absolutely clear to the public that it would not abandon the bank. Signs of Kröller’s 
earlier power over the bank were evident from the way in which its new caretaker 
president faced difficulties in dealing with the trading conglomerate in the aftermath of 
the crisis. But the Robaver-Müller tie’s direction of influence was eventually reversed, 
in no small part due to government intervention. This intervention changed the 
Robaver-Müller tie from a resource-dependency relationship into a bank-control one,87 
where the bank was able to use its interlocking directorate to extract itself financially 
from the trading conglomerate. 
Whilst the interlock may have been the necessary condition for the 1924 crisis, it 
was not a sufficient one. Robaver’s problems were first and foremost due to its earlier-
adopted universal banking policy, the interlock and decentralised management structure 
being consequences of this policy. There is an extensive literature on the costs and 
benefits of the universal banking, a type of business model also known as “relationship 
banking”. The existence of a trade-off between banking scope – the choice between 
universal and functionally-separated banking – and financial stability is contentious.88 
Universal banks are often touted as being able to reduce the problems of asymmetric 
information suffered by functionally-separated banks.89 However, their simultaneous 
presence in both the commercial and investment banking markets potentially creates 
damaging conflicts of interest. Universal banks are recognised to benefit from highly 
diversified portfolios. However, they may be less versatile during an economic 
downturn as they are geared towards the long-term and may struggle to meet depositor 
demand. 
An interpretive model describes how Robaver’s universal banking policy, and 
resulting managerial structure, could have been responsible for its problems. Boot and 
Thakor provide an appropriate starting point.90 They posit that firms face a trade-off 
between: (1) bank financing, where banks have the ability to better determine moral 
hazard, the tendency to take undue risk if this risk-taking can be hidden; and (2) capital 
market financing, where firms have the ability to adapt to performance information 
through prices. There exists some quality cut-off point, below which borrowers 
approach commercial banks – a firm’s moral hazard is too severe and requires bank 
monitoring – and above which they approach investment banks for access to capital 
markets. Whilst functionally-separated investment banks can choose their portfolios 
solely based on the costs and benefits of capital market variables, universal banks, 
which provide both services “under one roof”, are able to internalise any potential 
downside risks through their commercial banking arms. Conflicts of interest arise here 
because the principal in one half of the business acts as an agent in the other half. There 
may be a tendency for banks to positively select risky customers, due to the moral 
hazard of being able to cover any losses out of their depositors’ purse. Recognising this 
conflict, an adverse selection problem may arise; commercial clients with less risky 
businesses choose to exit the market à la Akerlof’s “market for lemons”,91 leaving only 
high-risk crisis-prone clients behind.  
Adding the practice of interlocking directorates to the Boot and Thakor 
framework, sharing managers with a bank in return for access to financing may reduce 
moral hazard problems, but it also makes it more costly for firms to end a banking 
relationship in the future, as the bank’s directors exert influence over the firm’s 
financing decisions. Clients with less risky businesses may therefore never seek out 
such ties in the first place, choosing alternative sources of finance that do not come with 
managerial ties. The net result is that banks that choose to adopt interlocks may be left 
with a portfolio of lemons; the problem suffered by universal banks is amplified when 
combined with interlocking directorates. Comparing Robaver with Ambank illustrates 
this point. Whilst the former enthusiastically adopted universal banking with interlocks, 
the latter was more reluctant. Whilst the former required a government bailout in 1924, 
the latter not only survived the crisis unscathed, but also provided the former with the 
managerial expertise necessary to resolve its troubles. 
Finally, adding direction of influence to this interpretive model helps explain 
why the Robaver-Müller tie was more damaging that the Robaver-Furness-Stokvis one. 
After a period in which “good” firms actively choose not to employ the services of a 
universal bank which adopts interlocks, and combined with that bank’s leadership 
managing to extract itself financially from those crisis-stricken firms over which it has 
some managerial influence, the bank is ultimately left only with the worst kind of 
clients: ones with which it has an interlock with a direction of influence running from 
the firm to the bank, where the bank does the firm’s bidding, whatever the cost. In 
summary, the use of interlocking directorates as a corporate governance structure 
ultimately led to financial instability in the Dutch case. 
Explanations of financial crises arising from information economics focus on the 
differences in information available to different parties in a financial contract.92 Adverse 
selection problems arise because lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers and end 
up setting a price that attracts only the risky. Moral hazard problems arise because 
borrowers have an incentive to engage in risky activities as lenders cannot easily 
ascertain their effort. Banks exist to reduce these problems, but are not always able to 
do so, such as in situations in which they have little ability to punish risky customers. In 
the case of Furness-Stokvis, the direction of influence was such that Robaver was easily 
able to punish its client by ending its financial relationship with the ailing concern. The 
direction of the Robaver-Müller tie meant that the bank’s customer was also its 
manager; punishing the conglomerate for bad behaviour proved difficult. 
In a deflationary cycle like that experienced in the Netherlands in the 1920s, 
wealth is redistributed from debtor to creditor, increasing the real value of debt and 
reducing borrowers’ net worth. Bankers, very aware of this problem, must reduce their 
exposure to risky customers and absolutely cannot be seen to increase it further out of 
fear that they will be identified as a weak player. As the Robaver case shows, if the 
direction of influence of an interlock prevents them from achieving this, then they may 
have to resort to hiding their problems from the world. But as information leaks out that 
a bank’s interlock is preventing it from restructuring, or even just a rumour that this 
might be the case, the bank may have to resort to drastic measures to resolve its 
problems. A crisis may become self-fulfilling;93 by acknowledging that it has sought 
outside help, a bank run may ensue as the panicked reaction of some depositors makes it 
rational for others to withdraw their deposits. The effect of the DNB communiqué must 
be seen in this light; the June 1924 run on Robaver’s branch network may never have 
occurred had it not been published. 
Conclusion 
The current literature on interlocking directorates is very good at counting and 
quantifying their costs and benefits. The case study approach used here complements 
this with a micro-perspective on conflicts of interest arising from bank-firm interlocks. 
A new historical narrative informs an interpretive model that uses economic theory to 
explain the conduct of bankers and their customers. It argues that the direction of 
influence of interlocks between universal banks and their clients greatly affects their 
ability to weather a financial crisis. Whilst perhaps not a sufficient condition for the 
1924 crisis episode, the Robaver-Müller interlock was a necessary one; the managerial 
tie created the conditions that drove the bank to take the drastic measures that ultimately 
led to its near-collapse. The interlock resulted in conflicts of interest that required state 
intervention to resolve – intervention so exotic in nature that the Netherlands’ bank of 
issue cannot be deemed to be a modern central bank in this period. This case also 
illustrates that a bank’s managerial structure has important consequences: had Robaver 
been more centralised, more hierarchical, then the abuses of Kröller may never have 
been possible.  
Dutch banks largely abandoned their universal banking business model 
following the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. The use of interlocking directorates as 
a corporate governance structure was consequently wound back. Dutch banks were 
sufficiently restructured by the time of the Great Depression to largely avoid further 
upsets. The Robaver-Müller interlock and its very public consequences may have 
played a part in this change of strategy. Bankers may have recognised that the potential 
direction of influence that came with some interlocks failed to guarantee business 
longevity. 
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Figure 1. Equity-deposit ratio of the Amsterdamsche Bank (Ambank), the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging (Robaver) and the average of the Big 
Five Dutch commercial banks (Big5) for the period 1917 to 1931. 
 
Notes: The equity-deposit ratio is calculated as banks’ least liquid resources (capital plus reserves) divided by their most liquid ones (deposits plus savings). 
The Big5 Dutch commercial banks are Ambank, Incasso-Bank, Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij, Robaver and Twentsche Bank.  
Source: Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek der Universiteit van Amsterdam, ‘Eerste Rapport’. 
Figure 2. The daily share price of the Amsterdamsche Bank (Ambank) and the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging (Robaver) in 1924. 
 
Notes: Share prices of companies listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange in the early twentieth century are quoted as a percentage of par value. Ambank had 
floated 55 million guilders worth of shares by the beginning of 1924, whilst Robaver had 75 million. 
Source: Officiële Prijscourant, daily editions (Monday to Saturday) for the entirety of 1924. 
